Prof. Leeat Yariv: "Strategic Decentralized Matching"

FGN-HSG Lecture 2024 (former: Walter-Adolf-Joehr-Lecture)
3rd of June 2024, 12:30-13:30, Room 09-011
After the lecture, the FGN-HSG offers a buffet lunch in the Foyer 09-21.


While the theoretical literature on two-sided matching markets has focused predominantly on analyzing outcomes generated through centralized clearinghouses, many markets are not fully centralized and have participants interacting in a less structured fashion: college admissions in the U.S., numerous labor markets such as the market for law clerks or junior economists, and others. Furthermore, almost all centralized markets are preceded or followed by decentralized matching opportunities for participants.Understanding outcomes generated by decentralized markets is therefore important for the design of decentralized and centralized institutions alike. This talk will present experimental evidence documenting decentralized matching interactions. It will also offer a theoretical framework for analyzing decentralized outcomes, allowing for both time and information frictions.

Leeat Yariv

is the Uwe E. Reinhardt Professor of Economics at Princeton University. She is a leader in economic theory and experimental economics. Her work is especially noteworthy for its integration of careful economic theory and models in experimental design. Please find more information about Prof. Leeat Yariv on her website.

Media Release


Flyer FGN-HSG Lecture 2024